JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. comparisons that emphasize differences is doubtless due, in part, to the fact that the war heightened our perceptions of those supposedly irreconcilable differences and, in part, to the fact that several dissimilarities were so striking, so unarguable, so obviously significant. While much of the scholarly controversy has concerned subtle sectional distinctions, whether in values, ideals, or other complex intangibles that might be read one way or the other, depending on the predilections of the interpreter, other disparities transcend subjectivity, based as they are on hard, quantifiable evidence.
its elements cannot be understood by mechanically attempting to weigh the significance of each of these elements and then adding up the total. The impossibility of contriving a simplistic calculus for measuring societies does not, of course, mean that a sensible comparison is impossible. It means only that such a comparison will inevitably be subjective and serve, at best, as a point of departure to those who evaluate the evidence differently.
A comprehensive comparison of the two sections would overlook nothing, not even the weather, which, according to Phillips, "has been the chief agency in making the South distinctive."9 In the space available here I shall focus on what our sociological friends might call three social indicators: (1) the economy, (2) the social structure, and (3) politics and power. In selecting these matters for examination, I do not mean to suggest that they are more important than values, ideals, the life of the mind, or any number of other features of antebellum life. Tangible phenomena may be easier to measure than intangible, but they offer no better clue to the essential character of a place and a people. I emphasize economic, social, and political themes because all of them are clearly important, the evidence on them is substantial, and each has recently been re-examined to interesting effect. THE ECONOMIC PRACTICES OF EACH SECTION-one hesitates to call them economic "systems" in the face of the contradictory and largely planless if not improvisatory nature of these practices-were similarly complex. Northerners and Southerners alike made their living primarily in agriculture. Guided by the unique weather and the unequal length of the growing seasons in their sections, Northern and Southern farmers increasingly specialized, but in dissimilar crops. Tobacco and, above all, rice, sugar, and cotton were largely unknown to the North. Yet in the South, as in the North, farmers-whether large or smallsought and, for the most part achieved, self-sufficiency. They produced more grains and corn than anything else and in both sections raised and kept domestic animals roughly equal in quantity and, it has recently been claimed, comparable in quality."0 In view of the regularity with which Northern farmers brushed aside the lonely voices in their midst who urged subordination of profits to the "long-range needs of the soil," their money-mindedness in planting wheat (their own great dollar earner) year after year, and their unsentimental readiness to dispose of "family land" so long as the price was right, what Stanley L. Engerman has said about Southern planters seems to apply equally well to Northern agriculturalists: they were certainly not "non-calculating individuals not concerned with money.""
The enduring popularity of Gone with the Wind suggests that the American popular mind continues to believe that the Old South was a land of large plantations populated by masters both honorable and courtly, cruel and sinful, by Southern belles "beautiful, graceful .. ., bewitching in coquetry, yet strangely steadfast," by loyal, lovable, comic, but sometimes surly Negroes, and by white trash or "po' buckra." American historians have, however, known for a least half a century that the plantation legend "is one of great inaccuracy"-false to the character of Southern society, to the diversity of Southern whites, and to the realities of black life.'2 Great plantations centering on splendid mansions did exist in the Old South but not in very great numbers.'3
The most distinctive feature of the antebellum Southern economy, as of Southern life as a whole, was, of course, its "peculiar institution." Slavery had not been unknown in the North, flourishing through much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and persisting in New Jersey until 1846. But it had involved relatively few blacks and had had slight effect on Northern life and thought. ' Northern public opinion, better represented by the authors of the Federal Constitution in 1787 and the Missouri Compromise in 1820 than by the abolitionists of the antebellum decades, accepted slavery, approved of doing business with those who controlled it, abhorred its black victims, and loathed Northern whites who agitated against it. Northern acquiescence in Southern slavery does not erase this most crucial difference between the sections, but it does argue for the complementarity and economic interdependence of North and South.'5
The profitability and other economic implications of antebellum slavery have become the subjects of intense recent debate, stimulating the development of cliometrics or the new economic history."6 Since slavery was more than a labor system, historians have also searchingly investigated its noneconomic implications for both blacks and whites.'7 A fair reading of the recent evidence and argument is that, while more slaves by far worked as field hands, slaves also performed with great efficiency a great variety of other jobs, many of them skilled, allowing for significant economic differentiation within the slave community.'8 And, as exemplary workers and as costly and valuable properties, skilled slaves were ordinarily spared gratuitous maltreatment or deprivation."' Despite the inevitable brutality of the system, slaves appear to have managed to maintain the integrity of their personalities, customs, values, and family ties.
Several trade unionists in the antebellum North agreed with slavery's apologists that not only the working and living conditions but in some respects the "liberty" enjoyed by Northern hirelings compared unfavorably with the situation of slaves.20 These were patently self-serving arguments, designed to put the lot of the Northern worker in the worst possible light. The fact remains that the economic gap between enslaved black and free white workers in antebellum South and North was narrower than historians once thought. Evidence bearing on the conditions of white Northern as well as black Southern labor demonstrates that during the middle decades of the nineteenth century the real wages of Northern workingmen declined and their living conditions remained bleak, their job security was reduced, their skills were increasingly devalued, and in many respects their lives became more insecure and precarious.21 At mid-century industrial workers in the South as in the North worked primarily in small shops and households rather than in factories. Trade unionists in Baltimore, Louisville, St. Louis, and New Orleans were with few exceptions skilled and semi-skilled white artisans, precisely as they were in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Pittsburgh. In Southern as in Northern towns and cities, the least skilled and prestigious jobs were those done preponderantly by Catholic immigrants rather than by older Protestant, ethnic groups.2 Significantly, the South attracted far fewer of the antebellum era's "new immigrants"-that is, Germans and Irish-than did the North. For all of their smaller numbers in the South, European immigrants played an economic and social role there that was not dissimilar to what it was in the North. Diverse measurable evidence indicates that the pattern of immigrant life in the United States was national, rather than distinctly regional, in character. A similar point can be made about Southern urbanism and manufacturing-namely, quantitative distinctiveness (or deficiency), qualitative similarity to the North. Although the value of Southern manufactured products was usually less than one-fifth of the national total during the antebellum decades, the South was hardly a region devoid of industrial production. Articulate Southerners "crusade[d] to bring the cotton mills to the cotton fields," and, whether due to their exhortations or to the play of market forces, the amount of capital the slave states invested in cotton manufacturing doubled between 1840 and 1860, surpassing their rate of population growth.23 Because the South nevertheless lagged far behind the Northeast in manufacturing, one influential school of historians has described the antebellum economy-and, for that matter, Southern society as a whole-as noncapitalist, prebourgeois, or "seigneurial."24 Some historians have criticized Southern deficiencies in commerce, finance, transportation, and manufacturing as manifestations of economic wrongheadedness and irrationality and have attributed to these deficiencies the South's defeat in the Civil War. A number of modern economic historians, cliometricians for the most part, have interpreted the evidence somewhat differently. Invoking the old argument of "comparative advantage," they have noted that heavy investment in cotton, the nation's great dollar earner in international trade, was hardly irrational, since it enabled the South to equal the national rate of profit during the era. got a return that compared favorably with industrial profits elsewhere. (Why, ask the critics, didn't they invest more of their capital that way?) If Southern manufacturing was outdistanced by that in the Northeast, it compared favorably with industrial production in the Northwest and, for that matter, in Continental Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. If the South suffered inordinately in the wake of the financial panics of 1837 and 1839, it was, as Reginald C. McGrane noted long ago, precisely because the South had speculated excessively in transportation projects and land acquisition as well as other investments. The South's "unusually favorable system of navigable streams and rivers" has been cited to explain its lag in railroads. Yet in the 1840s Southern railroads "equalled or exceeded the national average capitalization per mile." The views of many scholars are expressed in Gavin Wright's recent observation that "before the War the South was wealthy, prosperous, expanding geographically, and gaining economically at rates that compared favorably to those of the rest of the country."25 Antebellum Northern investors, like their counterparts in the South and in Europe, put their money into American products, industrial and agricultural, solid and flimsy, drawn almost entirely by the profit margin likely to result from their investment. Investors in all latitudes appear to have been indifferent to possible long-range consequences of their financial transactions, acting rather on the principle that the "rational" investment was the one likely to pay off. That the railroads, the diversified industry, and the commercial superiority of the North turned out to have important military implications in the 1860s could hardly have been anticipated by earlier profit-seekers. When the commercial magnates known as the Boston Associates invested heavily in factories built in the new suburbs of Boston, they hardly had in mind outfitting Union troops a generation later; they were much more concerned about maintaining close ties with Southern cotton magnates on whose raw materials they were so heavily dependent. There is something bizarre in historians, more than a century after the event, scrutinizing the economic behavior of antebellum capitalists and subjecting that behavior to unrealistic tests of rationality and farsightedness that these men themselves would have found farfetched.
To lag-whether in railroad mileage or urban growth-is not as great when it is measured in per capita rather than absolute terms26 explains away rather than explains these fundamental sectional differences. For it can reasonably be maintained that the antebellum South's comparatively small white population (which accounted for its high per capita rates) was not due to historical accident but to significant features, if not failings, in Southern civilization. That all differences between two communities indubitably have a historical explanationbe it the smaller population, the hotter climate, or the prevalence of enslaved blacks-in no sense detracts from the significance of those differences. The burden of my argument is not that antebellum economic developments in the states south of the Potomac were almost exactly like, let alone a mirror image of, those in the states north of the river but rather that the economies were similar in significant ways that are often taken for granted, as, for example, in the similar operation of the profit motive or the similarity of the laws of inheritance in the two sections. And even where, as in industrial production and labor systems, the South and North differed most glaringly, modern evidence has reduced and placed in a somewhat different perspective the gulf between them. As for the recent suggestion that the South was not capitalistic, I shall defer comment until I have first dealt with social and political matters, since capitalism concerns more than economic arrangements alone.
HISTORIANS HAVE LONG KNOWN that a society's social structure offers an important clue to its character. The kind of social classes that exist, the gulf between them, their roles in society, the ease or difficulty of access to higher from lower rungs on the social ladder, and the relationships between the classes tell as much about a civilization as do any other phenomena.27 What distinguishes modern from earlier historians in their treatment of social class is the extent to which they have borrowed from social scientists both in theorizing about class and in the methodology used for measurement. Employing these new approaches, historians have drastically modified earlier notions of antebellum society.
The ancient belief that the white antebellum South consisted of two classes, wealthy planters at the top and a great mass of poor whites below, may continue to command some popular acceptance. That belief has been so long dead among historians, however, that as early as 1946 Fabian Linden could remark that "the debunking of the 'two class' fallacy" had "become the tedious cli- ley and a group of scholars influenced by his work utilized hitherto neglected primary sources to reveal that the most typical white Southerners by far were small farmers working the modest acreage they owned with few, if any, slaves.'
The too neat portrait that the Owsley school drew of the white Southern social structure was quite similar to the picture of Northern society accepted by historians less than a generation ago.' The white population was ostensibly composed primarily of the great "middling orders," hard-working, proud, and not unprosperous farmers for the most part, whose chance to rise even higher so- cially matched the opportunities an increasingly democratic society gave them to exert political influence and power. Small groups of rich men-great planters in the one clime and merchants and industrialists in the other---occupied the highest social plateau; professionals who served the rich were slightly above the middle, which was occupied by small business people and independent farmers, skilled artisans, and clerks; and below them stood industrial and landless agricultural laborers. Since class is determined not by bread alone, blacks-whether slave or free and regardless of how much individuals among them had managed to accumulate-were universally relegated to the lowest levels of the social structure, scorned even by white vagrants and frequently unemployed workers, urban and rural, who constituted America's equivalent of a propertyless prole- unclear, into a more sharply focused picture. By digging deeper, particularly in nineteenth-century data on wealth and property, historians have come close to knowing the numbers of families belonging to different wealth strata and the amount of wealth these families owned. The beauty of the new evidence on who and how many owned what and how much is that in the antebellum era wealth appears to have been the surest sign of social, as well as of economic, position. Antebellum wealth was almost invariably made in socially acceptable ways. Modern scholars have found that "the social divisions of antebellum America were essentially wealth-holding categories." The upper class did not comprise so much the families who "controlled the means of production" as it did the families who "controlled the vast wealth created largely through the exchange of goods produced."32 Degree of wealth was the surest sign of the quality of housing, furnishings, and household goods a family could afford, of its style of living and uses of leisure, and of the social circle within which it moved and its individual members married. Gathering from the manuscript census schedules, probate inventories, and tax assessors' reports statistically valid samples or, in some cases, evidence on every family in the community under study, modem scholars have been able to arrange the antebellum Southern and Northern populations on a wealth-holding scale. While it is close to a statistical inevitability that the distribution of wealth in the South and North would not be precisely the same, the most striking feature of the evidence is how similarly wealth was distributed-or maldistributed-in the two sections.
On the eve of the Civil War one-half of the free adult males in both the South and the North held less than 1 percent of the real and personal property. In contrast, the richest 1 percent owned 27 percent of the wealth. Turning from the remarkable similarity in sectional patterns of wealthholding at the bottom and the very top, the richest 5 to 10 percent of propertyowners controlled a somewhat greater share of the South's wealth, while what might be called the upper middle deciles (those below the top tenth) held a slightly smaller share in the North. The South also came close to monopolizing wealthy counties, the per capita wealth of which was $4,000 or more and, despite its smaller population, the South, according to the 1860 census, contained almost two-thirds of those persons in the nation whose worth was at least $110,000. According to Lee Soltow, the leading student of this evidence, these sectional disparities "could be attributed almost entirely to slave values.... If one could eliminate slave market value from the distribution of wealth in 1860 ..., the inequality levels in the North and South were similar."33
In view of the centrality of slavery to the antebellum South, it is idle to speak of "eliminating the market value" of slaves from the sectional comparison. did not add to their own private wealth or to the wealth of the employers they served, their labor created wealth for themselves and for these same capitalists at rates of productivity that, I believe, even Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman would concede compared favorably with the rates of the most efficient slaves. In other words, the North had access to a form of wealth, free labor, that was roughly as valuable per capita as was slave wealth, however absent this Northern wealth was from the reports prepared by census takers and assessors. Given the known habits of these officials to overlook small property holdingsprecisely the kind of holdings that would have been owned by Northern working people-and to accept as true the lies people swore to as to their worth,34 it is likely that the fairly substantial cumulative wealth owned by small farmers and modest wage earners was almost entirely omitted from the wealth equation. Such groups were far more numerous in the North than in the South. Had slaves been treated as part of the potential property-owning Southern population to which they actually belonged, instead of being treated as property pure and simple, the total wealth of the antebellum South would have been diminished by several billion dollars: the product of multiplying the number of slaves by the average market price of almost $1,000 per slave.35 The addition of nearly four million very poor black people to the number of potential propertyowners in the South would have increased its rate of inequality (and the Gini coefficient of concentration that measures it), although not everywhere to the same extent.36
Wealth in both sections was distributed more equally-perhaps the more apt phrase is less unequally-in the countryside than in towns and cities. While the rural North has been less intensively investigated than its Southern counterpart, enough research has been completed to disclose that the North was hardly a haven of egalitarian distribution of property. Rural Wisconsin (which had a Gini coefficient of inequality as high as that of antebellum Texas), the Michigan frontier, and northwestern New York State were centers of inequality and pov- erty. At mid-century, the proportion of white men who owned land in any amount was substantially lower in the Northwest than in the South. The percentage of free males owning land in the North as a whole was slightly smaller than in the South. Owing to the absence of slaves and to the relative paucity of very large farms, wealth was somewhat less unequally distributed in the rural North than in the South.37
In investigating the distribution of wealth in the antebellum rural South, scholars have probed data on different states, counties, and regions. The patterns throughout are remarkably similar, whether for wealth in general, land and real estate, or personal and slave property. Accentuating the maldistribution of landed wealth-whether in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, the "cotton South," or the agricultural South as a whole-was a fact of life that the Owsley school neglected: the dollar value per acre of large farms owned by slave-owning planters was substantially greater than the value per acre of the small farm. And yet, regardless of the nature of the soil or the proportion of large farms in a given region, the rates of wealth concentration were remarkably similar as well as constant during the decades before the war. Paralleling the recent finding that in antebellum Texas, no matter what the differences were "in climate, soil, and extent of settlement, the most striking fact is. . . the high degree of concentration in wealthholding across all the regions," another recent study reports no great differences in "the degree of inequality" between the cotton South and the other "major agricultural regions" of grain, tobacco, sugar, and rice production in 1860.38
The distribution of slave wealth closely followed the pattern of other forms of Southern wealth.39 During the decade before the war, slaveownership was confined to between 20 and 25 percent of white families, and maldistribution of this form of property was the rule within the slave-owning population. Half of all slaveowners owned five or fewer slaves, with only one-tenth owning the twenty or more slaves that by Ulrich B. Phillips's definition made them "planters." Less than one-half of 1 percent owned one hundred or more slaves. As with other forms of wealth, the concentration of slave wealth increased slightly between 1850 and 1860. , 136-37, 153-59, 165-66, 169-70, 178. waukee, the great cities on the Northeastern seaboard, and a dozen other Northern urban centers was impressively consistent and glaringly unequal. The sharp maldistribution of the 1820s and 1830s became more widely skewed with the passage of time (the Gini coefficients of inequality for 1860 matched those prevalent in the South). On the eve of the Civil War, the wealth of most cities, while greatly augmented, was "less widely dispersed than it had been earlier"; the propertyless groups in Stonington (Connecticut) and Chicago, for example, comprised between two-thirds and three-fourths of all households by the outbreak of the war.45
Nor do sectional rates of vertical mobility appear to have been much different. In 1856 Cassius M. Clay told an Ohio audience that "the northern laboring man could, and frequently did, rise above the condition [into] which he was born to the first rank of society and wealth," but he "never knew such an instance in the South."46 Recently unearthed evidence on the social origins of the men in the "first rank" does not sustain Clay's surmise, so popular with contemporary yeasayers. In the South, "increasing barriers to slaveownership resulting from higher slave prices and the growing concentration of wealth" left "lesser planters," not to mention laboring men, with their "aspiration thwarted."47 And in the North-whether in Wayne County (Michigan), Newport, Stonington, small towns in Massachusetts, Chicago, and Brooklyn, or the great cities of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia-eminent and rich men of humble birth were a rarity. Evidence on the more likely movement from a lower social position to an adjacent one, rather than to the very top, remains in pitifully short supply. In antebellum Philadelphia, small New England counties, and rural Georgia, even the modest movement from one plebian level to another appears to have seldom occurred.48
Throwing important, if indirect, light on the relatively slight opportunities for upward social and economic movement antebellum America offered to poor or economically marginal men is the era's high rate of physical or geographical mobility. In rural as well as urban communities, in large cities and small, and on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line, armies of footloose Americans were on the move, following trails never dreamed of in the Turner thesis. One-half of the residents, primarily the poorer and propertyless, left those communities from one decade to another in their search for a more acceptable living.49 I have no doubt that future research will yet disclose that, during what was a period of economic expansion in both sections, significant numbers of Americans improved their lot, even if modestly.50 To date, however, the data reveal equally slight rates of social mobility and high rates of geographical mobility on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line.
Carl Degler has recently observed that Southern society "differed from northern in that the social hierarchy culminated in the planter, not the industrialist."5' At mid-century, great Northern fortunes, in fact, owed more to commerce and finance than to manufacturing. What is perhaps more important is that a sharply differentiated social hierarchy obtained in both sections. In Degler's phrase, planter status was "the ideal to which other white southerners aspired." A good case can be made for the equally magnetic attraction that exalted merchant status had for Northerners. If the fragmentary evidence on Virginia, Georgia, and the Carolinas, which Jane H. Pease has so effectively exploited, is any indication, then great planters lived less sybaritically and consumed less conspicuously than historians have previously thought. If Philip Hone's marvelous diary-two dozen full-to-the-brim volumes of life among the swells during the antebellum decades-has broader implication, then the Northeastern social and economic elite commanded a lifestyle of an elegance and costliness that, among other things, proved irresistably attractive to the aristocratic Southerners who graced Hone's table, pursued diversion with other members of Hone's set, and married into its families-the Gardiners, Coolidges, Coldens, Bayards, Gouverneurs, and Kortrights."
That the social structures of the antebellum South and North were in some important respects similar does not, of course, make them carbon copies of one another. In this as in other respects the chief difference between the sections was that one of them harbored a huge class of enslaved blacks. John C. Calhoun, fully as democratic as those in Northern states, he concluded that by this "progressive expansion in the application of the doctrine of political equality .. ., the aristocratic planter class had been shorn of its political power." Power, he claimed, had now been transferred to "the great mass of whites."57 As Green's critics were quick to point out, popular suffrage and theoretical rights to hold office are not synonomous with popular power.58 Yet these are not empty or hollow rights. That they have often been made so testifies not to their insignificance but rather to the importance of the larger context in which democratic political gains are registered. It remains neither a small matter nor a small similarity that on the constitutional level the antebellum North and South were similarly democratic and republican.59 At least as important as a society's system for selecting political officeholders is the kind of men who are regularly selected and their characteristic performance in office. In collecting evidence on political figures, scholars have sought to measure the measurable-above all, the social and economic characteristics of officeholders and party leaders. I think it safe to assume that historians performing these chores have the wit to know that an individual of whatever background is perfectly capable of transcending it. Their unspoken working assumption is one that has been known since before Aristotle: the material and social circumstances of men in power may throw some light on their motives and behavior, taking on added significance when these circumstances are uniform or close to uniform. That Charles A. Beard's mechanistic overemphasis of these points may have given them a bad name does not detract from their usefulness.
Abundant data have been accumulated on the occupations, wealth and property ownership, church affiliations, education, and other social indicators not only of antebellum officeholders in several dozen cities equally divided between South and North and in counties in every Southern state but also of state officials in all of the Southern and most of the Northern states and of Congressmen from most of the states in the Union. The resultant picture inevitably is not uniform. Humble county and town officials, for example, were less likely to be drawn from the highest levels of wealth and from the most prestigious occupations than were men who occupied more exalted state and federal positions.0 Aldermen and councilmen usually did not match the mayor either in wealth or in family prestige. But the relatively slight social and economic differences found between men at different levels of government or between men nominated by the parties that dominated American politics from the 1830s to the ual's ideology and of the diverse elements that help shape it, the effect of these circumstances cannot be assumed and is likely to vary from one individual to another. Although the political philosophies of men do not lend themselves to quantitative or precise measurement, the burden of recent scholarship is that most Southern and Northern political activists were similarly ambitious for worldly success, opportunistic, materialistic, and disinclined to disturb their societies' social arrangements.i' Men with values such as these were ideally suited to lead the great pragmatic parties that dominated antebellum politics.65 Many parties flashed across the American political horizon during the antebellum decades. That the Antimasonic Party, the Liberty Party, and the Free Soil Party almost entirely bypassed the South is an important difference between the sections. The South was not hospitable to organized political dissent, particularly dissent hostile to the expansion of slavery. These parties were small and ephemeral organizations whose leverage stemmed not so much from any great voting support they were able to command as from the nearly equal strength in both sections of the great major parties, the Democrats and the Whigs. Whoever would evaluate the actions of those who held executive or legislative office in antebellum America must, almost invariably, evaluate Whigs or Democrats-at least until the mid-1850s, when a new party emerged during the great controversy over the extension of slavery in the territories.
The Democrats and Whigs were national parties drawing their leaders and followers from both sections. They could usually count on intersectional support for the national tickets they presented quadrennially to the nation at large. Interestingly, the presidency-whether occupied by Southerners Jackson, Tyler, Polk, and Taylor and the Southern-born Harrison or Northerners Van Buren, Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan-was in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s in the hands of Whigs and Democrats who displayed great sensitivity toward the political and economic interests of the slave-owning South.' In the 1840s Congressmen voted not by region as Northerners or Southerners but primarily as Whigs and Democrats. Party rather than sectional interest prevailed in the roll calls on most issues reaching the national political agenda. In the 1850s, as Thomas B. Alexander has reported, "forces greater than party discipline ... were evidently at work . . ., forcing party to yield to section on a definable number of issues." Yet, even in the 1850s, "both major parties maintained a high level of cohesion and intersectional comity" with regard to the range of issues not bearing on slavery and its right to expansion.67
The great national issues of antebellum politics, culminating as they did in Sumter and the ensuing war, were of transcendant importance to Americans. A good case can nonetheless be made that local and state politics touched the lives of people more often and more directly than did national politics, particularly during an era when the men in the nation's capital were inclined to treat laissez faire as an article of faith.68 State governments in North and South, by contrast, engaged in vigorous regulation of a wide range of economic activities.69 Local governments taxed citizens and, if with limited effectiveness, sought to provide for their safety, regulate their markets and many of their business activities, look after the poor, maintain public health, improve local thoroughfares, dispose of waste, pump in water, light up the dark, and furnish some minimal cultural amenities through the exercise of powers that characteristically had been granted by state government. States chartered banks, transportation companies, and other forms of business enterprise, determined the scope of such charters, themselves engaged in business, disposed of land, and regulated local communities. The great question is how did the actual operations of local and state governments in the North and South compare during the antebellum decades.
Antebellum state government was almost invariably controlled by either Whigs or Democrats. The major parties were essentially state parties, bound together in the most loosely organized national confederations. Citizens divided not by geographical section but by party preference within each state. The parties were in all latitudes characteristically controlled by tight groups of insiders that sometimes monopolized power, sometimes shared it with rival factions, in the one case as in the other controlling nominations and conventions, hammering out policy, disseminating and publicizing the party line, organizing the faithful to support it, enforcing strict discipline, and punishing those who dared challenge either the policies or the tactics pursued by the leadership. While party policies could conceivably have been infused with the noble principles proclaimed in party rhetoric, such infusion rarely appears to have been the case. The "Albany Regency," the "Richmond Junto," the "Bourbon Dynasty" of Arkansas, and similar cliques in control elsewhere have been described as realists rather than idealists. To call attention to the gulf between the pronouncements and the actions of antebellum state political leaders is not to indulge in cynicism but simply to report the facts as historians have recorded and interpreted them. J. Mills Thornton's recent description of antebellum Alabama's political leaders as demagogues who felt a "secret contempt for the voters" they publicly extolled and whose "primary function was to gain as many offices as possible for the party faithful" is not unlike historians' characterizations of other leaders in other states, both in the North and in the South.70 In New York as in Alabama, in Michigan as in Georgia, in Pennsylvania as in Mississippi, in Illinois as in Missouri, the "compelling aim" of the major parties and the groups that ran them appears to have been "to get control of the existing machinery of government" and to dispense to party loyalists the jobs that attended electoral success. While seemingly preoccupied with patronage and gerrymandering or with keeping from the agenda of state governments issues that posed a "threat to property and the social order or which threatened ... stability,""7 the major parties did not sidestep altogether economic, social, and cultural issues of some moment. The most germane feature of roll call evidence on such issues is how little there is to choose between legislative voting patterns in the South and the North.72
In towns and cities, unlike the states, party counted for little. Candidates for the mayor's office and the local council or board of aldermen did not fail to remind voters of the moral superiority of their own parties. But, as students of antebellum urban politics have noted, it mattered little whether this major party or that won the election or whether the town was located north or south of the Mason-Dixon line. True, the problems faced by cities in Texas, where "Indian fighting was probably the most important municipal activity," were unknown in the Northeast (and, for that matter, the Southeast). The amazing thing is how similar were both the problems taken up by local government everywhere and the measures enacted for coping with them.
Perhaps in no other milieu was governmental policy so permeated with class bias. Whether it was Natchez or Springfield, Charleston or Brooklyn, New Orleans or Boston, the lawyers, merchants, and large propertyowners who occupied city hall ran things in the interests of the "wealthier inhabitants." Tax rates were everywhere minuscule and property flagrantly underassessed, at the insistence of large taxpayers. Valuable lots were leased to rich men at ridiculously low rates, if not sold to them for a song. Funds provided by the niggardly bud- gets typical of the time were spent most freely to improve or widen streets used by businessmen rather than to clean streets in the neighborhoods of the poor. Improved public facilities for disposing of waste or carrying fresh water into the city were usually introduced first in upper-class residential districts. The "indisputable connection between the policies of the city council and the interests of the wealthier inhabitants" that Richard Wade discerned in Cincinnati early in the era could be found in most other cities.
A contemporary New Yorker attributed to corruption the not atypical favoritism the city showed its propertied elements, observing that "nearly every alderman has in some degree owed his success to the personal efforts and influence of 'backers,' who must be recompensed for their services."73 In the absence of evidence that local officeholders were so motivated, it is more reasonable to assume that they acted out of an honest conviction that the prosperity of the larger community depended in the first instance on the prosperity of its wealthiest inhabitants. That such beliefs were colored by the material advantages of those who possessed them, as by the conservative social values typically absorbed by men of their standing, seems equally reasonable. In any case, the pattern of uncommonly prosperous propertyowners controlling localities in the interests of men and families similarly situated was not confined to one geographical section.74
Power is not, of course, confined to control of government.75 Control over banks, credit, capital, communications, and voluntary associations, which in an era of laissez faire often exercised more influence than did public authorities over education and culture, crime and punishment, social welfare and poverty, gave to those who had it a power that was barely matched by those who held the reins of government. The burden of recent research is that small social and economic elites exercised a degree of control over the most important institutions in the antebellum North that bears close resemblance to the great power attributed to the great planter-slaveowners by William E. That slavery is not the classic labor system associated with a Marxist definition of capitalism is, of course, true. The problem with Marx as Pundit of capitalism, for all the undeniable brilliance of his interpretation, is that he was, as he conceded, more interested in changing the system than in explaining it. Those of us content with merely understanding so complex a phenomenon as capitalism know that, whether in its labor system or in other respects, it is a flexible and constantly shifting order, susceptible of diverse definitions. The Southern economy did differ in important respects from the Northern, developing special interests of its own. Yet, far from being in any sense members of a colony or dependency of the North, the Southern upper classes enjoyed close ties with the Northern capitalists who were, in a sense, their business partners. The South was an integral component of a wealthy and dynamic national economy, no part of which conformed perfectly to a textbook definition of pure capitalism. In part because of the central place in that economy of its great export crop, cotton, the South from the 1820s to the 1860s exerted a degree of influence over the nation's domestic and foreign policies that was barely equalled by the antebellum North. India within the Empire indeed! The South's political system of republicanism and limited democracy, like its hierarchical social structure, conformed closely to the prevailing arrangements in the North, as they also did to the classic features of a capitalistic order.
The striking similarities of the two antebellum sections of the nation neither erase their equally striking dissimilarities nor detract from the significance of these dissimilarities. Whether in climate, diet, work habits, uses of leisure, speech and diction, health and disease, mood, habits, ideals, self-image, or labor systems, profound differences separated the antebellum North and South. One suspects that antebellum Americans regarded these matters as the vital stuff of life. The point need not be labored that a society, one-third of whose members were slaves (and slaves of a distinctive "race"), is most unlike a society of free men and women. An essay focusing on these rather than on the themes emphasized here would highlight the vital disparities between the antebellum South and North. And yet the striking dissimilarities of the two antebellum sections do not erase their equally striking similarities, nor do they detract from the significance of these similarities.
The antebellum North and South were far more alike than the conventional scholarly wisdom has led us to believe. Beguiled by the charming version of Northern society and politics composed by Tocqueville, the young Marx, and other influential antebellum commentators, historians have until recently believed that the Northern social structure was far more egalitarian and offered far 85 My source for this epigram is my class notes for a graduate course in medieval economic history that I took thirty years ago at Columbia University. Fortunately, the authority for the citation is the reliable and admirable Karl Helleiner, my teacher.
greater opportunity for upward social movement than did its Southern counterpart and that white men of humble position had far more power in the Old North than they did in the Old South.86 In disclosing that the reality of the antebellum North fell far short of the egalitarian ideal, modern studies of social structure sharply narrow the gulf between the antebellum North and South.87 Without being replicas of one another, both sections were relatively rich, powerful, aggressive, and assertive communities, socially stratified and governed by equally-and disconcertingly-oligarchic internal arrangements. That they were drawn into the most terrible of all American wars may have been due, as is often the case when great powers fight, as much to their similarities as to their differences. The war owed more, I believe, to the inevitably opposed but similarly selfish interests-or perceived interests-of North and South than to differences in their cultures and institutions.
It is a commonplace in the history of international politics that nations and societies quite similar to one another in their political, social, and economic arrangements have nevertheless gone to war, while nations profoundly different from one another in their laws of property or their fundamental moral and philosophical beliefs have managed to remain at peace.8 The Peloponnesian War, which, like the American Civil War, was a bitter and protracted struggle between two branches of the same people whose societies were in vital respects dissimilar from one another, appears to have owed little to these differences. In Thucydides' great account, Athens and the Athenians were profoundly unlike Sparta and the Lacedaemonians, whether in "national" character, wealth, economic life, ideals and values, system of justice, attitudes toward freedom, or lifestyle. But to Thucydides, as to the leading spokesmen for the two sides, these dissimilarities were one thing, the causes of the war quite another. Athens and Sparta fell out primarily because both were great imperial powers. "The real cause of the war," concluded Thucydides, "was formally ... kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable."89 None of this is to say that sectional differences had no influence whatever on the actions of those influential men that in , 1951), 15, 33, 40, 46-49, 50, 65-67, 80-81, 104-06, 118, 189, 253, 440, 509 .
April 1861 culminated in the outbreak of the American Civil War. The point rather is that, insofar as the Peloponnesian War throws any light whatever on the matter, wars between strikingly dissimilar antagonists break out not necessarily because of their differences, important as these are, but because of their equally significant similarities.
Late in the Civil War, William King of Cobb County, Georgia, reported that invading Union officers had told him, "We are one people, [with] the same language, habits, and religion, and ought to be one people."' The officers might have added that on the spiritual plane Southerners shared with Northerners many ideals and aspirations and had contributed heavily to those historical experiences the memory and symbols of which tie a people together as a nation. For all of their distinctiveness, the Old South and North were complementary elements in an American society that was everywhere primarily rural, capitalistic, materialistic, and socially stratified, racially, ethnically, and religiously heterogeneous, and stridently chauvinistic and expansionist-a society whose practice fell far short of, when it was not totally in conflict with, its lofty theory.
